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Less Than Perfected:
Uncertainty in Illinois Judgment Lien
Law
FRANCIS EDWARD STEPNOWSKI*

INTRODUCTION

A hard-won judgment is of no value unless the plaintiff can
enforce it against the property of the defendant. Ten years ago, the
Federal District Court remarked that the laws of Illinois governing
the creation of judgment liens in personal property of the defendant
were "muddled."' The court recommended that the Illinois General
Assembly revise the statutes to clarify what procedure can give rise to
a judgment lien on personal property.2 Since that time, the case law
has grown more muddled, and various courts have contradicted others
regarding the issue. This article explores the methods by which a
judgment creditor can obtain a lien on personal property, including
intangible personal property, by means of levy3 and a citation to
discover assets. 4 This article also recommends that the law of citations
be clarified and the laws of execution and levy, which have not been
changed since the nineteenth century, be reformed and streamlined to
with the
conform to modern practice and to become compatible
5 and the Bankruptcy Code. 6
Code
Uniform Commercial
A court attempting to determine whether a judgment creditor has
a lien on the personal property of a debtor when the creditor has
commenced collection or supplementary proceedings is faced with the
following contradictory but never overruled precedents: (1) a lien on
tangible personal property is created only by the delivery of a writ of
execution to the sheriff for the purpose and intent of levying upon
* B.A., University of Dallas, J.D., Northwestern University. Staff Attorney,
State of Illinois Appellate Court Second District.
1. General Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 788, 797 (C.D. Ill. 1982).
2. Id. at 797-98.
3. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-111, 12-112, 12-158 (1991).
4. Id. para. 2-1402 (1991) (formerly ch. 110, para. 73 (1981)).
5. Id. ch. 26, paras. 9-101 to 11-108 (1991).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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the property; 7 (2) a citation does not create a lien;' (3) an execution
and levy creates a lien on intangible property which cannot be enforced
by a levy but can be enforced by a citation; 9 (4) a citation by itself
creates a lien on personal property;' 0 (5) a citation creates a lien on
all the debtor's personal property including intangible personal property;" (6) an execution and levy cannot create a lien on intangible
personal property but only on goods and chattels;" (7) a lien is created
merely by delivering the certified copy of judgment to the sheriff
without the necessity of a seizure;' 3 (8) the lien on intangible property
is created only by and dates from an order of turnover in a citation
proceeding;' 4 (9) the lien of citation dates from the initial issuance of
the citation rather than the order of turnover;'" (10) the lien of citation
dates from the service of the citation;' 6 (11) there is no authority from
Illinois courts for holding that a citation creates a lien; 17 and (12)
despite the lack of authority from Illinois courts, and contradictory
authority from Federal courts, a citation does create a lien, but the
8
lien is unperfected.'
This muddled state of affairs has arisen from the continuing
evolution of creditors' rights procedures from Elizabethan times, the
reliance upon bare dicta from previous cases and the ignoring of

contrary precedent. Prior to this century, the only methods of enforcing a judgment were the cumbersome procedures of an execution

7. See Sweetser v. Matson, 153 Ill. 568, 582, 39 N.E. 1086, 1091 (1894);
Crawford v. Schmitz, 139 Il. 564, 570, 29 N.E. 40, 42 (1891); Western Union Cold
Storage Co. v. Rose, 60 Il. App. 452, 456 (1895).
8. Baronski v. Shust, 218 Ill. App. 8, 11 (1920).
9. Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 54-55, 236 N.E.2d 425, 430 (1968).
10. Mid-West Nat'l Bank v. Metcoff, 23 II1. App. 3d 607, 611, 319 N.E.2d
336, 340 (1974); Bank of Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 Il. App. 2d 243, 247, 243
N.E.2d 501, 503 (1968).
11. Kaiser-Ducett Corp. v. Chicago-Joliet Livestock Mktg. Ctr., Inc., 86 Ill.
App. 3d 216, 219, 407 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 (1980).
12. In re Marriage of Rochford, 91 111. App. 3d 769, 774, 414 N.E.2d 1096,
1101 (1980).
13. In re Salem Energy Supplies and Services, Inc., 92 B.R. 361, 363 (Bankr.
S.D. I11.1988).
14. General Tele. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 788, 797 (C.D. Ill 1982).
15. In re Foluke, 38 B.R. 298, 301 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1984).
16. In re Einoder, 55 B.R. 319, 325 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1985).
17. Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 132 F.R.D. 670, 676-77 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (citing In re Jaffe, Ill B.R. 701, 708 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1990)).
18. In re Lifchitz, 131 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); In re T.M.
Sweeney & Sons, LTL Servs., Inc., 120 B.R. 101, 105 (Bankr. N.D. IiI. 1990).
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and levy and the creditor's bill.' 9 Even the levy and execution process,
which should be well defined by now, is fraught with uncertainty and
does not provide a bright-line test to determine the perfection of a
lien in the debtor's assets. The supplemental proceeding, or citation
to discover assets, was gradually expanded to provide the most
2°
efficient method of enforcing judgments. The number of cases
construing levies declined, and the creditor's bill has been eliminated.
Unfortunately, no Illinois court has yet to determine, outside of dicta,
the effect and extent of a citation in creating a lien on discovered
property. Most of the recent decisions involving this law have arisen
in the bankruptcy courts, which routinely decide issues involving the
priority of liens. 2' Without guidance from the Illinois courts or the
legislature, the bankruptcy courts have reached widely varying results.
I.

LEVY AND EXECUTION

The most fundamental method of enforcing a judgment is the
process formerly known as the execution and levy. When a creditor
obtained a money judgment against a judgment debtor, the court
issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to levy or seize sufficient
property of the debtor to satisfy the amount of the judgment. In 1978
and 1982, the legislature made semantical changes to the statutes. The
new Code of Civil Procedure ("Code") eliminated the writ; the
certified copy of the judgment serves the purpose formerly held by
the writ of execution. 22 Illinois courts ruled that a lien was deemed to
be created in the property seized by the sheriff, who must exercise
23
control over the debtor's property by some public and notorious act.
The lien did not arise automatically with the entry of judgment; while
the money judgment concerns the parties' rights and obligations, it
cannot of itself attach to a particular item of the judgment debtor's
property. 24 Neither the Code nor the former Judgments Act ever
explicitly provided for the creation of a lien in personal property as
it now does for real estate. 25 (Previously, the lien in real estate arose
19. See Robert H. Little, Comment, Enforcement of Creditors' Rights, 1975

U. ILL. L. FORUM 424.

20. See Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc., 126 Ill. 2d 307, 313, 533 N.E.2d

1080, 1083 (1989); Little, supra note 19, at 434.

21. See Lifchitz, 131 B.R. at 833.
22. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1501 (1991); In re Marriage of Logston,
103 III. 2d 266, 280, 469 N.E.2d 167, 173 (1984).
23. Davidson v. Waldron, 31 111. 120, 130 (1863); see Minor v. Herriford, 25
Ill. 304, 305 (1861).
24. Logston, 103 Ill. 2d at 278, 469 N.E.2d at 172.
25. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-101 (1991).
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upon judgment and was enforceable for one year; 26 now the lien arises
only upon the filing of the memorandum of judgment with the
recorder of deeds. 27) Instead, section 12-111 uses language of limitation "No judgment shall bind the goods and chattels of the person
against whom it is entered, until a certified copy thereof is delivered
to the sheriff or other proper officer to be served." ' 2 Each part of
this statute, formerly section 9 of the Judgments Act, 29 is weighted
with significance, as will be discussed infra.
The lien of judgment attached to all goods and chattels owned
by the debtor. 0 While the sheriff held the goods seized from an
execution and levy, no one else could gain possession and all parties
had notice of the security interest.3 ' Priority among judgment creditors
related back to the time each creditor's writ of execution was delivered
to the sheriff no matter which creditor's writ resulted in the successful
levy.3 2 As long as the sheriff had the goods in his possession or that
of his custodian, it was a simple matter to distribute the proceeds
upon sale to the creditors according to the priority determined by
time.33 The sheriff had a duty to follow expeditiously the direction of
the writ.3 4 In fact, the sheriff was liable if he failed to act expeditiously
to enforce the writ. 3 Bona fide purchasers were protected when they
26. Smith v. Toman, 368 111. 414, 416, 14 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1938) (citing § I
of the Judgments Act (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, para. 1 (1937)) which states that a
judgment is a lien from the time it is rendered, but if no execution or levy is
performed within one year, the judgment ceases to be a lien).
27. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-101 (1991).
28. Id. para. 12-111.
29. Id. ch. 77, para. 9 (1981) (repealed).
30. See Roth v.Snow, 245 Il.App. 582, 585 (1927).
31. See Logsdon v.Spivey, 54 Ill.
104, 107 (1870).
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-169 (1991); Hanchett v. Ives, 133 Ill.
332,
336-37, 24 N.E. 396, 397-98 (1890); Rogers v. Dickey, 6 IIl. (1 Gilm.) 636, 644-45
(1844).
33. Hanchett, 133 Ill.
at 337, 24 N.E. at 397-98; Logsdon v. Spivey, 54 Ill.
at
108; Rogers v. Dickey, 6 Il.(1 Gilm.) at 644; Century Pipe & Supply Co. v. Empire
Factors Corp., 19 Ill.
App. 2d 165, 170-71, 153 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1958).
34. Gouwens v. Gouwens, 237 111. 506, 514, 86 N.E. 1067, 1070 (1909); Western
Union Cold Storage Co. v. Rose, 60 Ill.
App. 452, 456 (1895).
35. See Logsdon v. Spivey, 54 II1. at 108-09; People ex rel. Gregg v. Palmer,
46 11. 398, 403 (1868); Ross v. Weber, 26 11. 221, 224 (1861); People v. Johnson, 4
Ill. App. 346, 347 (1879). But see Ilg v. Burbank, 59 11. App. 291 (1894) (Sheriff
liable for trespass in executing a levy upon property not owned by judgment debtor.);
French v. Snyder, 30 I1. 339, 344 (1863) (Sheriff must seize enough property to
satisfy judgment, taking into account distress prices, but not an excess amount of
property, which would be oppressive.); Klemm v. Bishop, 56 Ill.
App. 613, 616 (1894)
(Sheriff had defense that property did not belong to debtor.).
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was liable
bought the debtor's property prior to a levy; the sheriff
36
expeditiously.
more
for his failure to seize the property
The lien as a security interest, however, proved to be illusory
when the goods were outside the possession of the sheriff. The
property was bound only during the life of the execution, or the
3
return of the certified copy of judgment, which lasted only 90 days; "
only the property seized during the life of the writ continued to be
bound by the lien.38 The lien of an execution would not carry over to
a subsequent execution. 39 The levy acted as a satisfaction of judgment
4
and suspended further efforts of the creditor to collect, 0 although the
4
lien continued in the other goods and chattels owned by the debtor. '
The earlier judgment creditor lost his priority when he permitted the
42
debtor to stay in possession of the goods. Any subsequent execution
and levy would have priority over the previous creditor who did not
43
foreclose upon the debtor's goods. Even a creditor who acted out
of kindness by letting the debtor stay in possession while the settlement
4
was negotiated lost his priority to a subsequent levying creditor. A
with the efforts of other creditors to sell
creditor could not interfere
45
the debtor's property.
Moreover, the creditor could not register his judgment with the
sheriff for the purpose of registering or creating his security interest.
Such a purpose was deemed to be a "perversion" and violative of
the court's issuance of a writ and caused the loss of priority, even
46
where there was no fraudulent intent. For a creditor to obtain a lien
on personal property, she must place the execution in the hands of
the sheriff and direct a levy, but the lien attaches as soon as the
36. Davidson v. Waldron, 31 111. 120, 130 (1863).
37. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-110 (1991); Minor v. Herriford, 25
Ill. 304, 305; Brush v. Seguin, 24 Ill. 254 (1860).
38. Logsdon, 54 Ill. at 108-09.
39. Garner v. Willis, 1111. (Breese) 368, 369 (1830).
40. Harris v. Evans, 81 Ill. 419, 421 (1876); Ambrose v. Weed, II Ill. 488, 490

(1850).

41. Everingham v. National City Bank, 124 Ill. 527, 538, 17 N.E. 26, 30 (1888).
42. Sweetser v. Matson, 153 Il. 568, 582-83, 39 N.E. 1086, 1091 (1894);
Gilmore v. Davis, 84 Ill. 487, 489 (1877); Rogers v. Dickey, 6 I1. (1 Gilm.) 636, 640

(1844).
43. Sweetser, 153 I11. at 582, 39 N.E. at 1091.
44. Id. at 584, 39 N.E at 1091; Century Pipe & Supply Co. v. Empire Factors
Corp., 19 I11.App. 2d 165, 171, 153 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1958).
45. Ross v. Weber, 26 Ill. 221, 223-24 (1861).

46. Payne v. Brownlee, 196 I11.App. 108, 112 (1915); see Sweetser, 153 Ill. at
N.E. at 1090.
39
583,
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execution is delivered to the sheriff.4 7 Delivery of the writ to the
sheriff while instructing him to do nothing conferred no lien priority, 4
but there was no settled rule to determine what action by the senior
creditor would void the lien. 49 A mere failure of the plaintiff to give
directions as to the manner or time of executing the writ did not
constitute interference with the writ so as to void the lien.50 Thus, the
creditor was not obliged to give specific directions to the sheriff as
the sheriff already had a court-imposed duty to enforce a writ.,, Most
importantly, the creditor must have the intent that property be seized,
as giving the sheriff discretion whether to levy would void the writ. 5 2
This intention is retained under current section 12-111 which provides
that the lien of judgment is binding when the certified copy is not
merely delivered to the sheriff, but delivered "to be served." This
new section modifies section 9 of the prior Judgments Act which used
the phrase "to be executed." The service of an execution includes all
necessary acts and proceedings the sheriff must take to generate the
funds to pay the judgment and includes the sale of property.53 While
the statutes do not require that an execution be served on the
defendant, equity demands that the sheriff give notice to the defendant
when practical.5 4 The sheriff first serves the judgment upon the
defendant as in other civil cases, giving her 10 days to select property
exempt from execution.5 5
There were two reasons for this lost priority rule. The first was
that the failure to press the debtor to reduce his goods interfered with
the sheriff's duty to satisfy the judgment.16 The lenient creditor lost
his priority by relieving the sheriff of his duty imposed by the court.5 7
47. Grimes v. Rodgers, 263 Il1. App. 429, 434 (1931); see Western Union Cold
Storage Co. v. Rose, 60 Il1. App. 452, 456 (1895).
48. Gilmore v. Davis, 84 Ill. 487, 489 (1877). But see Koren v. Roemheld, 6
Ill. App. 275, 279 (1880) (Instruction to do nothing deemed too ambiguous to void
lien.).
49. Everingham v. National City Bank, 124 Ill. 527, 536, 17 N.E. 26, 29 (1888).
50. Kiehn v. Bestor, 30 111. App. 458, 465 (1888).
51. Gouwens v. Gouwens, 237 Ill. 506, 514, 86 N.E. 1067, 1070 (1909).
52. Western Union Cold Storage Co. v. Rose, 60 Il. App. 452, 456 (1895).
53. See Fallows v. Contintental & Commercial Trust & Say. Bank, 235 U.S.
300, 307 (1914); Elkin v. People, 4 Ill. 207, 208 (1841); 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions
§ 207 (1967).
54. Rogers v. Barton, 386 Il. 244, 249, 53 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1944).
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-1002 (1991); see Weskalnies v. Hesterman,
288 Ill. 199, 203-04, 123 N.E. 314, 316 (1919).
56. Sweetser v. Matson, 153 Ill. 568, 581, 39 N.E. 1086, 1091 (1894).
57. Id. at 582; Western Union Cold Storage Co. v. Rose, 60 Ill. App. 452, 456
(1895).
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The court ordered that the judgment be satisfied and not that a lien
be created. The second reason was that a creditor could not give
notice of his security interest to bona fide purchasers of personal
property; without delivery, a transfer was valid between the parties
but was not effective against other creditors or bonafide purchasers."
The law abhorred secret liens. Unlike the lien created in real estate,
the creditor had no central location in which to file a memorandum
of his judgment. 9 The priority rules were used to reward creditors
for their diligence in reducing the debtor's property. Personal property
lien.6
was also deemed too easily moved and convertible to sustain a
Arguably, these rationales have lesser significance in today's
business climate than in the times of Queen Elizabeth I when the rule
originated, 6' or of King Charles II, on whose statute section 12-111
literally is based. 62 The Code of Civil Procedure has abolished writs
63
directing the sheriff to reduce property to satisfy a judgment. The
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code led to the creation of a
central filing location for the perfection of security interests and other
64
methods of providing notice to other creditors. Today, personal
property, especially intangible assets, may be more valuable than real
estate, and these assets can take many forms and loci beyond the
reach of a sheriff. A levy on personal property may act as a bar to
further satisfaction attempts. 65 Section 12-113 retains an archaic Illinois rule which can force creditors to seek slow satisfaction from
illiquid real estate before levying upon more liquid personal property.6
Creditors, not the sheriff, should bear the primary responsibility for
searching the debtor's myriad forms of property.
The inflexibility of the levy process restricts its attractiveness as
a collection procedure, although it is highly effective in forcing debtors
58. Logsdon v. Spivey, 54 I11. 104, 107 (1870); see Grimes v. Rogers, 263 Ill.
App. 429, 433 (1931).
59. Century Pipe Supply Co. v. Empire Factors Corp., 19 Ill. App. 2d 165,
171, 153 N.E.2d 298, 302 (1958).
60. Davidson v. Waldron, 31 111. 120, 130 (1863); Century Pipe, 19 Ill. App.
2d at 170, 153 N.E.2d at 301.
61. See Sweetser v. Matson, 153 I11. 568, 581, 39 N.E. 1086, 1090 (1894);
Everingham v. National City Bank, 124 Ill. 527, 536, 17 N.E. 26, 28 (1888) (citing
Stat. 13 Eliz., ch. 5).
62. See Rogers v. Dickey, 6 Ill. (1 Gilm.) 136, 642 (1884) (citing 29 Car. II,

ch. 3).

63. See supra note 20.
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, paras. 9-101 to 11-108 (1991).
65. Harris v. Evans, 81 111. 419, 421 (1876); Smith v. Hughes, 24 Ill. 270, 277
(1860).
66. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-113 (1991).
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to come to terms with the judgment. However, a levy upon goods
and chattels is ineffective when a sheriff employing civil process
cannot break down doors to access the personal property.6 7 Sometimes
all the sheriff can do is to padlock the door. Creditors are given the
choice of shutting down the debtor's business and selling the goods
at distress prices. This remedy seldom provides a sufficient satisfaction
of the judgment and prevents the creditor from organizing an orderly
sale of the assets or creating a payment plan to reduce the judgment
by future profits from the assets. An income stream may be more
valuable than any equity in a debtor's assets. Indeed, it was held that
a creditor who stopped the sheriff from selling goods at a distress
sale for the purpose of organizing an orderly sale lost his priority to
a creditor with no compunctions, even though the junior creditors
had the most to gain from the senior creditors' efforts to increase the

proceeds.6

The rule of lost priority was applied mechanically rather than
rationally. The subsequent judgment creditors made no showing that
they detrimentally relied upon the first creditor's failure to levy the
goods. It is extremely unlikely that a creditor viewed the debtor's
possession of goods, extended credit based solely on the debtor's mere
possession of the goods, suffered a default, brought suit, served
process, obtained a judgment, and went to execution during the 90day period of a prior creditor's execution lien. The rule has less
meaning today, when most debtors' properties are already encumbered
with purchase money security interests and operating loans, and many
debtors utilize leased equipment. Few creditors rely solely on a
debtor's mere possession of goods prior to extending credit, goods or
services, if they check the creditworthiness at all. Moreover, a creditor
who lends such credit should not be protected more than a creditor
who fails to check the UCC filings prior to extending credit. Finally,
the courts fail to address the situation where the debtor stays in
possession by posting a bond with the sheriff under section 12-162.69
These situational priority rules indicate that a judgment creditor
must do more than rely upon a supposed lien of judgment when
composing a workout with the debtor. Moreover, a hasty levy could
67. Snydacker v. Brosse, 51 111. 357, 360-61 (1869).
68. Sweetser v. Matson, 153 11. 568, 580-81, 39 N.E. 1086, 1089-91 (1894).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-162 (1991) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
77, para. 47 (1981)); see Brush v. Seguin, 24 I11. 254 (1860) (Debtor mortgaged
property after posting bond during levy; mortgagee took subject to judgment lien.);
Ambrose v. Weed, 11 111. 488, 490-91 (1850).
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70
force the debtor into filing for protection of the Bankruptcy Code,
with its attendant delays and expenses. In bankruptcy, the debtor
7
could obtain a turnover of the seized assets ' and void the creation of
arising within 90 days of
liens, including judicial liens, as preferences
72
relief.
for
petition
the
the filing of
Nonetheless, the language of an execution and levy are fixtures
in the law of the State and Bankruptcy Code. For example, a guaranty
for collection applies when an execution against the principal has been
returned unsatisfied. 73 A lien creditor is defined as a creditor who has74
a levy.
acquired a lien on the relevant property by attachment or
Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the trustee in bankruptcy
the same lien as a creditor that obtains an execution that is returned
unsatisfied. 7 The Illinois enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transuses the language of an execution and levy returned
fers Act also
76
unsatisfied.
Most of the cases explaining the nature of the priorities are over
a hundred years old. They have never been overruled by the courts77
1958.
or nullified by the legislature, but were reaffirmed as late as
The statutes have not changed substantively, but were only recodified
into the Code of Civil Procedure. 7 The application of these cases
makes uncertain whether any execution is perfected, whereas today's
business climate requires bright-line rules to determine priority among
creditors and the protection of bona fide purchasers.
In addition, recently, the courts have split into two contradictory
paths concerning the issue of liens on intangible property, i.e., property other than goods or chattels, such as bank accounts or the
beneficial interests in land trusts. These paths will be discussed infra
in the section on citations, which also may bind intangible property.
0
In summary, in Levine v. PascaP9 and Asher v. United States, the
scope of the lien of a levy was expanded to include an unexecutable

70. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
71. Id. §§ 542-43; see id. § 541 (property of the estate).
72. Id. § 547.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 3-419 (1991) (formerly para. 3-416 (1989)).
74. Id. para. 9-301(3).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2) (1988).
76. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 59, para. 108(b) (1991).
77. Century Pipe & Supply Co. v. Empire Factors Corp., 19 Ill. App. 2d 165,
171, 153 N.E.2d 298, 301 (1958).
78. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 12-111, 12-112, 12-158, 12-169 (1991).
79. 94 I1l. App. 2d 43, 54-55, 236 N.E.2d 425, 430 (1968).
80. 570 F.2d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 1978).
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lien on intangible property. However, in In re Marriageof Rochford,81
the court reaffirmed the older rule that no lien attached to intangible
property upon an execution and levy.8 2
II.

THE FORMER REMEDY OF THE CREDITOR'S BILL

Former section 49 of the Chancery Act 3 authorized a postjudgment court to compel the discovery of property, to prevent the
transfer of the property and to compel satisfaction of a judgment
from the property. However, because it was an equitable remedy, it
was conditioned on the lack of an adequate remedy at law; thus, the
creditor had to pursue an execution and levy which was returned by
the sheriff unsatisfied. The return of an execution unsatisfied (nulla
bona) gave the judgment creditor no specific property subject to
execution, and she could obtain a lien only by the aid of a court of
equity.8 4 Since the execution was returnable after 90 days, 5 and the
remedy required the filing of another suit, the delays and expense
detracted from the efficiency of the remedy. However, prior to 1955,
it remained the only method to obtain a satisfaction of judgment
from intangible property.
While the Chancery Act did not explicitly provide for the creation
of a lien, courts held that a lien arose from the time process was
served on the defendants named in the bill.86 Creditors who were
diligent in pursuing hidden assets were rewarded for their efforts and
granted priority over other judgment creditors who proceeded only
by means of execution and levy upon the debtor; the lien of the levy
did not extend to property in the hands of third parties. 7 Conversely,
a creditor who levied upon goods and chattels, as opposed to intangible property, had priority over another pending creditor's bill proceeding. 88 The lien attached to the property upon the filing of the suit
and service on the named parties,8 9 and was effective even after the
81. 91 111. App. 3d 769, 774, 414 N.E.2d 1096, 1101-02 (1980).
82. See Crawford v. Schmitz, 139 I11.564, 570, 29 N.E. 40, 42 (1891).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 399 (1981) (repealed); Id., ch. 22, para. 49
(1973) (repealed). See generally Justice O'Shea, The Sequestrator - The Court's
Enforcer, 70 ILL. B.J. 494 (1982).
84. Balletine v. Beall, 4 I1. 203 (1841).
85. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-110 (1991).
86. Rappleye v. International Bank, 93 Ill. 396, 400 (1879).
87. Id. at 400-01.
88. First Nat'l Bank v. Gage, 93 I11. 172, 174-75 (1879).
89. Hallorn v. Trum, 125 I11.247, 253, 17 N.E. 823, 824 (1888); People ex rel.
Russel v. Michigan Ave. Trust Co., 233 I11. App. 428, 430 (1924).
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9
debtor's death.9 The lien did not relate back to the date of judgment, '
because a lien cannot bind those without notice of it.92 Thus, bona
fide purchasers could obtain clear title to property transferred by the
93
debtor to another party where that party was not served, or before
he was served. 94 The lien of the creditor's bill attached to all the
property of the debtor. 95 However, where the creditor's bill was
prosecuted to benefit all creditors, a lien may not arise when the
assets were not discovered solely through the efforts of the prosecuting
creditor's efforts. 96

III.
A.

THE CITATION TO DISCOVER ASSETS

EVOLUTION AND CURRENT CONTRADICTORY HOLDINGS

The citation to discover assets was originally a device to obtain
information regarding a judgment debtor's assets. In Baronski v.
Shust,97 a judgment creditor served a citation upon the debtor's bank,
but subsequently the bank paid out the debtor's checks against the
9
account leaving only 75 cents for the creditor. The appellate court
held that the creditor did not obtain a lien against the account. Unlike
the garnishment laws, 99 the citation statute did not provide for the
creation of a lien. However, the Baronski court conditioned its holding
by noting that the creditor had not imposed a restraining order upon
the bank.""' No court has ever explicitly overruled Baronski. In 1941
and 1955 the legislature enacted the precursor to section 2-1402, which
expanded greatly the scope of the citation, now termed a supplemen-

90. Gage, 93 Ill. at 174-75.
91. People ex rel. Russel, 233 Ill. App. at 430.
92. Hallorn v. Trum, 125 Ill. 247, 254, 17 N.E. 823, 825 (1888).
93. Id. at 254-55.
94. People ex rel. Russel, 233 Ill. App. at 430.
95. Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 22 Ill. App. 3d 410, 415, 318 N.E.2d 52, 56
(1974).
96. Reis v. Ravens, 68 11. App. 53 (1896); cf. Aspling v. Ferrall, 232 Ill. App.
3d 758, 597 N.E.2d 1221 (2d Dist. 1992) (comparing claims which benefit one creditor
personally to all creditors generally).
97. 218 Ill. App. 8, 11 (1920).
98. Id.
99. ILL.

REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-707 (1991).
100. Baronski, 218 Ill. App. at 10-11.
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tary proceeding. 10 ' The statute was based on a New York statute10 2
which gave broad powers to the courts to apply assets to a judgment. 0 3
The statute did not provide for an imposition of a lien on discovered
property. Rather, to preserve the status quo, the clerk of the court
may issue a citation with a restraining provision prohibiting the thirdparty respondent from transferring away any property of the judgment-debtor within its control.' °4 The restraining provision is discretionary with the creditor, who need not post a bond or file an affidavit
of need. 10 5 The court can enforce the restraint under punishment of
contempt or by entering a judgment for the amount of the transferred
property.1° 6 In addition, the creditor may not only discover assets,
but may also obtain an order for the turnover of assets, for the
garnishment of funds due to the debtor, or for the sheriff to sell
discovered property. 0 7 The court may compel any person to assign
property to the same extent as a court could do in any other proceeding
to enforce a judgment. 08 Section 2-1402 is not limited to "goods and
chattels" as is the execution and levy statute,' °9 and it is not conditioned upon an execution returned unsatisfied as was the creditor's
bill statute. Creditors may obtain multiple citations and proceed
against the debtor and third parties simultaneously." 0
No later Illinois case squarely addressed whether a citation proceeding could create a lien. However, in Levine v. Pascal,"' the
judgment creditor both delivered a writ of execution to the sheriff
and caused the clerk of the circuit court to issue a citation against
the trustee of a land trust. The creditor sought the debtor's beneficial
101. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402 (Smith-Hurd 1983); see Elmhurst
Auto Parts, Inc. v. Fencil-Tufo Chevrolet, Inc., No. 2-91-1242, slip op. at 7-9 (Ill.
App. Sept. 24, 1992).
102. Section 781 of the Civil Practice Act of New York.
103. See Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage Co., 126 Ill. 2d 307, 313-15, 533 N.E.2d
1083-84 (1989); Valley Pontiac-Cadillac-Jeep-Eagle Inc. v. Jim Thornton Pontiac
Cadillac, Inc., 187 Ill. App. 699, 703, 543 N.E.2d 950, 953 (1989); Froehlich v. J.R.
Froehlich Mfg. Co., 93 111. App. 3d 179, 186, 416 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (1981).
104. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l10, para. 2-1402(d) (1991).
105. Bank of Aspen, 126 Ill. 2d at 316, 533 N.E.2d at 1084.
106. Id. at 313, 533 N.E.2d at 1083.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402(b) (1991).
108. Id. para. 2-1402(b)(5); North Bank v. F & H Resources, Inc., 53 Ill. App.
3d 950, 953, 369 N.E.2d 174, 176 (1977) (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10, para. 73(2)
(1975)).

109. See In re Marriage of Rochford, 91 111. App. 3d 769, 775, 414 N.E.2d
1096, 1102 (1980).
110. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 277(a),(g) (134 II. 2d R. 277(a),(g); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
S10A, paras. 277(a),(g)).
111. 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
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interest, which was intangible personal property. The court held,
citing general authority, that the creditor became a lien creditor when
the writ of execution was placed with the sheriff, and while the
creditor could not effectively enforce his lien against the intangible
personal property by means of the writ of execution, he could enforce
it through citation proceedings." 2 The citation proceedings were analogized to a creditor's bill, in which intangible property could be
reached. The lien creditor, as defined by UCC section 9-301(3),'1 was
deemed to have a perfected security interest over the contractual lien
creditor, which had not recorded its security interest in the personal
property." 4 (The legislature subsequently amended Article IX of the
Commercial Code to provide that filing a financing statement is no
longer necessary to perfect a security interest in the beneficial interest
of a land trust.)" 5 Levine is significant because it spun off several
cases holding that a citation proceeding by itself created a lien and
several cases holding that the lien of execution could attach to
intangible property.
In National Bank of Albany Park v. Newberg," 6 the appellate
court held that, regarding a chose in action payable by a third party,
a garnishing creditor obtained a superior lien over the interest of an
earlier creditor who obtained an assignment of the chose in action
after serving a citation upon the debtor alone. In dictum, the court
added that it agreed that a prior assignment of the chose in action
could take priority over a later garnishment;" 7 however, the court
noted that the particular assignment was not immediate and would
not operate until the debtor actually received his settlement proceeds,
whereas the garnishment actually was served on the third-party garnishee prior to the payment of settlement. Newberg did not posit that
a citation could create a lien, but only that a prior assignment of the
debtor's interest would defeat a later garnishment." 8 Nevertheless,
Newberg has been cited as authority that a turnover order entered in
a citation proceeding against a third party, since it acts as an assignment divesting a debtor of his interest, would create a lien with
priority over other creditors' interests; however, the reasoning underlying this position would not support subordinating bona fide pur112. Id. at 54-55, 236 N.E.2d at 430.

113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-301(3) (1991).
114. Levine, 94 Ill. App. 2d at 55, 236 N.E.2d at 430.
115. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-302(l)(c) (1991).
116. 7 Ill. App. 3d 859, 865-67, 289 N.E.2d 197, 201-03 (1972).
117. Id. at 865, 289 N.E.2d at 201-02.

118. See Isar Electric Co. v. Ingram Constr. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 110, 119-20,
362 N.E.2d 771, 771 (1977).
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chasers' interests to the creditor's priority.1 9 Newberg also shows that
mere service of the citation upon the judgment debtor was not
sufficient to create a lien in property in the hands of the third party;
the creditor needed to obtain an order of turnover against the third
party. 20
In Bank of Broadway v. Goldblattl2 l and Mid-West National
Bank of Lake Forest v. Metcoff, 22 the appellate court relied upon
the language of Levine to hold that a creditor could obtain a lien
upon a beneficial interest in a land trust, intangible property, by the
service of a citation. 23 However, these courts misinterpreted Levine,
which held that the lien was-created by the execution and levy and
was enforceable only by means of a citation.1m The creditors in
Goldblatt and Metcoff had not employed any other proceeding by
which a lien could be created. Goldblatt and Metcoff, while relying
on a misinterpretation of Levine, became the precedent for other
courts to hold that a citation creates a lien in discovered assets.125 One

scholar who noted the misplaced reliance on Levine, queried whether
Metcoff and Goldberg were no longer controlling because the legislature amended the Commercial Code to provide for the perfection
of a contractual security interest in a beneficial interest of a land
trust.126

Other Illinois cases have increased the confusion. In Kaiser-Ducett

Corp. v. Chicago-JolietLivestock Marketing Center, Inc.,127 the ap-

pellate court ruled that a judgment does not become a lien against
personal property unless a writ of execution is delivered to the sheriff
to be "properly executed." The court stated the rule applies to both
tangible or intangible property although a citation to discover assets

text.

119. See Little, supra note 19, at 433. See infra note 167 and accompanying

120. See George W. Breitsameter, A Comparison of Supplementary Proceedings
& Creditor'sBills, 70 ILL. B.J. 694, 695 (1982). See infra note 165 and accompanying
text.
121. 103 Ill. App. 2d 243, 243 N.E.2d 501 (1968).
122. 23 I11.App. 3d 607, 319 N.E.2d 336 (1974).
123. Goldblatt, 103 Ill. App. 2d at 247, 243 N.E.2d at 503; Metcoff, 23 Ill.
App. 3d at 611, 319 N.E.2d at 340.
124. Levine v. Pascal, 94 I11.App. 2d 43, 55, 236 N.E.2d 425, 430 (1968).
125. Asher v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 570
F.2d 682, 683 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Marriage of Rochford, 91 111. App. 3d 769, 775,
414 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1980); see Poulos v. Litwin, 193 Ill. App. 3d 35, 39, 549
N.E. 2d 855, 858 (1989).
126. Little, supra note 19, at 434.
127. 86 I11.App. 3d 216, 407 N.E.2d 1149 (1980).
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must also be instituted to obtain the intangible personal property of
the debtor. The court cited both Levine and Metcoff, even though
Metcoff required no first step of execution. According to Kaiser, the
purpose of the lien is to prevent the debtor from disposing of his
property to defeat the satisfaction of the debt."'2 Kaiser also held that
the lien applies only to property found in the county in which the
creditor delivers the writ of execution to the sheriff. 29 In Kaiser, no
lien was created because the writ was not properly executed where the
creditor delivered the writ to the sheriff of the wrong county. 30 Since
the asset was a chose in action, it was intangible property which
Kaiser held to have situs in the county of the judgment debtor's
headquarters. Kaiser and Levine implied that an execution would
create a lien over the debtor's intangible property even though a
proper sheriff could not take possession of an intangible asset or the
judgment creditor did not give notice to the debtor or to creditors.
Moreover, by finding that the creditor failed to obtain any lien, and
by stating that only an execution could create a lien, Kaiser implied
that the creditor's service of citations upon the officers of the debtor
and third-party payor did not create a lien either.'
312
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Asher v. United States
attempted to reconcile Levine with prior Illinois law. In Asher, the
first creditor obtained a judgment and delivered a writ of execution
to the sheriff. A month later, the United States obtained a judgment
and served a notice of levy upon the debtor's bank and seized the
proceeds of his account. The first creditor obtained a citation to
discover assets the next day, found the account depleted and subsequently sued the United States for the proceeds. Since a bank account
represents only a debt payable to the customer, it is intangible
property. The Seventh Circuit held that the first creditor had a prior
lien which was created by the execution. The court added that while
Levine was inconsistent with earlier Illinois cases which held that a
lien could not attach to property over which there was no power of
sale, since the newer remedy of citation did provide a power of sale
128. Id. at 219, 407 N.E.2d at 1151-52.
129. Id. at 219, 407 N.E. 2d at 1152; cf. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. B.J. Dodge
Fiat, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 3d 356, 361, 475 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 (1985) (Lien of judgment
reached funds at a bank, but issue of whether lien arose from execution or garnishment not raised.).
130. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 407 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing Haugens v. Holmes, 314
Ill. App. 3d 166, 170, 41 N.E.2d 109, 112 (1942)).
131. See General Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 788, 795 (C.D. Ill. 1982).
132. 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cir.), aff'g 436 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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of intangible property, the execution created a lien in intangible
property. 33 Despite the contentions of later courts, 3 4 the Asher court
had no opportunity to determine whether a citation could by itself
create a lien because the creditor's citation occurred after both parties'

executions commenced.'35

In In re Marriage of Rochford,3 6 the appellate court undercut
Levine and Kaiser without mentioning them by holding that an

execution and levy could not create a lien on intangible property,

since the statute authorized the levy only upon "goods and chattels."
The court held that a lien of judgment can arise only where there is
a power to sell property thereunder. Since a levy gave a creditor no

right to sell intangible property, the levy did not give rise to a judgment
lien. 37 Thus, Rochford reestablished prior Illinois law that the lien of

execution and levy does not apply to intangible property, 38 but the
court did not try to reconcile its result with Levine, Kaiser or Asher.
Instead, the Rochford court said, in dictum, that the creditor could
create a lien on intangible property only through the filing of a
creditor's bill in equity or by instituting proceedings to discover assets,
citing Metcoff and Goldblatt,3 9 but it did not address the misinterpretation of Levine in Metcoff or Goldblatt. The court surmised that
intangible property may be subject only to sequestration but not to
execution.' 40 Thus Rochford became further precedent for the rule

that a citation can create a lien. Since the court was speaking in
dictum, it did not address when or how the lien was created, against
whom it was effective or its duration. However, the statement followed the discussion on obtaining an order of turnover from the court
after a determination that the debtor had an interest in the discovered
4
property.' '

133. Asher, 570 F.2d at 684.
134. See, e.g., In re Einoder, 55 B.R. 319, 321 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1985); In re
Lapiana, 31 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1983).
135. See also In re Stoner Invs., Inc., 7 B.R. 240, 241 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1980).
136. 91 11. App. 3d 769, 414 N.E.2d 1096 (1980).
137. Id. at 774, 414 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing Lehman v. Cottrell, 298 II1. App.
434, 440, 19 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1939)) (Judgment lien does not cover homestead
property because there is no power to sell homestead property.).
138. Crawford v. Schmitz, 139 11. 564, 570, 29 N.E. 40, 42 (1891).
139. Rochford, 91 111. App. 3d at 775, 777, 414 N.E.2d at 1102 (citing MidWest Nat'l Bank v. Metcoff, 23 I11.App. 3d 607, 319 N.E.2d 336 (1974); Bank of
Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 I11.App. 2d 243, 243 N.E.2d 501 (1968)).
140. Rochford, 91 111. App. 3d at 777, 414 N.E.2d at 1102. But see Poulos v.
Litwin, 193 Ill. App. 3d 35, 41, 549 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1989) (Creditor could not use
section 2-1402 to serve a third party to collect a debtor's claim for personal injuries.).
141. In re Marriage of Rochford, 91 111. App. 3d 769, 777, 414 N.E.2d 1096,
1103-04 (1980).
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The Federal District Court in General Telephone Co. v. Robinson 142
noted the muddle of authority regarding whether a citation created a
lien. 143 After discussing the prior cases, the court ultimately relied
upon a law journal article'" and determined that only an order of
turnover in a citation proceeding created a lien.145 The article suggested
that an order of turnover of assets issued by a court pursuant to
section 2-1402(b) in a citation proceeding would create a lien on the
discovered property; however, a simple restraint issued by the clerk
of the court pursuant to section 2-1402(d) with the initial service of
the citation would not create a lien. 46 The Robinson court noted that
the legislature, rather than the147judiciary, should determine whether a
lien of judgment was created.
The issue is of utmost importance in a bankruptcy proceeding,
in which the court orders the creditors paid according to their priorities. The bankruptcy courts must rely on state law to determine the
priorities.

The trustee in bankruptcy may avoid unperfected security

interests, including those of judgments, to the same extent as a bona
fide purchaser of the debtor's assets. 49 In addition, the trustee in
bankruptcy may avoid the fixing of judicial liens within 90 days of
the filing of the petition for relief. 50 Thus, the date of the creation
of the lien is also important. Given the muddled condition of the law,
the various bankruptcy judges have reached several inconsistent results
regarding if and when a citation creates a lien.
For example, in In re Stoner Investments, Inc.,'

the creditor

had served citations on third parties holding intangible assets of the
debtor. The bankruptcy court relied on the language in Levine: "it is
of no materiality in this cause whether the beneficial interest in a land
trust be categorized as a chose-in-action or some other form of
personal property. A judgment creditor may attach on either under
142. General Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 788 (C.D. Il.1982).
143. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. at 797.
144. See generally Breitsameter, supra note 119.
145. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. at 797.
146. Breitsameter, supra note 120, at 696.
1982); cf.
147. General Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 788, 797 (C.D. I11.
414, 417, 14 N.E.2d 478, 480 (1938); Haugens v. Holmes,
Smith v. Toman, 368 I11.
314 Ill. App. 166, 169, 41 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1942) (There was no lien at common
law; it is a statutory construction.).
1984).
148. See, e.g., In re Foluke, 38 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988).
150. Foluke, 38 B.R. at 300; 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982).
App.
1980); cf. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 108 I11.
151. 7 B.R. 240 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
3d 51, 57, 438 N.E.2d 933 (1982) (Bank restrained by citation from setting off
debtor's funds.).
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section 2-1402(b)(5)."' 52 The Stoner court concluded that, "[t]he
above use of the language 'may attach' clearly indicates that a citation
to discover assets creates a lien which attaches to any personal property
discovered pursuant to the citation."' 3 The court held that no writ
of execution was necessary to create the lien; however, the debtor
failed to support its argument that the lack of an order of turnover
resulted in an ineffective lien.3 4 In In re Lapiana,'"1 the bankruptcy
court was faced with a situation where the state court had explicitly
imposed a lien during the course of supplemental proceedings commenced against the debtors. The bankruptcy court did not consider
whether the commencement created a lien or whether the order of the
court created a lien. 5 6 However, the lien was found to be subordinate
to a later creditor who recorded its interest with the recorder of deeds.
The bankruptcy court did not examine the quality of the citation
creditor's lien. Nevertheless, both Stoner and Lapianawere considered
further precedent for the holding that a citation created a lien.
In In re Foluke, 5 7 the bankruptcy court, even while citing Robinson, ruled that a lien was created on the date of the issuance of the
citation by the clerk of the court rather than the date of the order of
turnover entered by the court. The court relied upon dicta in Lapiana
and Robinson. This holding was modified by the court in In re
Einoder,5 8 which held that the lien was created as of the date of the
service of the citation upon the third-party respondent. The court
based its holding on the language of section 2-1402(a) which reads
"[a] supplementary proceeding shall be commenced by the service of
a citation issued by the clerk." The court did not analyze the intrinsic
nature of a citation in its discussion of when the lien arose. This last
view has been followed by most other bankruptcy courts. 159
The bankruptcy court in In re Jaffe,160 however, refused to follow
this line of cases, and stated that those cases relied on Metcoff and
Goldberg, which misinterpreted Levine. The Jaffe court held that no
lien is created by citation proceedings and that only a levy and
execution could create a lien. The Jaffe holding was adopted by the
152. Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill.
App. 3d 43, 55, 236 N.E.2d 425, 430 (1968).
153. Stoner, 7 B.R. at 241.
154. Id.at 242.
155. 31 B.R. 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983).
156. Id.at 742.

157. 38 B.R. 298 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1984).

158. 55 B.R. 319, 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1985).
159. See In re Lifchitz, 131 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1991).
160. 111 B.R. 701, 705 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990).
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Federal District Court in Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd. 161
The Water Technologies court did not consider whether Levine was
outside the line of precedent but considered only that Metcoff and
Goldblatt misconstrued Levine and could not form the precedent for
later cases holding that a citation created a lien; the court also
considered the citation to be merely a discovery tool without the
protections of due process. 62 Jaffe and Water Technologies considered
that only the legislature could provide for the creation of a lien.
However, a subsequent bankruptcy court, in Lifchitz and T.M.
Sweeney, 163 while acknowledging the scholarship of the Jaffe and
Water Technologies courts' legal research, declined to follow the
superior District Court. It decided to follow what it considered "the
clear weight of Illinois authority," namely, Asher and the other
bankruptcy court cases from Foluke and Einoder, holding that the
service of a citation creates a lien. Lifchitz and T.M. Sweeney are
important because the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (Eastern Division) distinguished between the creation of a lien
by the service of a citation and the perfection of the lien by the order
of turnover. T.M. Sweeney and Lifchitz held that the judgment
creditors did get a type of lien by serving the citation; however, the
liens were avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy because they were not
perfected by prosecuting them to an order of turnover within 90 days
of the preferential transfer period found in section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court considered the "transfer" to occur only at
the order of turnover; the court thus silently overturned its precedents,
Foluke and Einoder, which held the transfer to occur at the commencement of the citation proceeding. While Lifchitz considered only
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, T.M. Sweeney also applied its
analysis to section 544(a), under which the trustee may avoid all
unperfected security interests, including a citation not prosecuted to
an order of turnover. 1
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further explained the limits
of the lien and distinguished between the lien and the enforcement
mechanism, relying on Asher. In King v. Ionization International,
Inc. ,'165 the creditor obtained a default judgment and "obtained a writ

161.
162.
163.
Sweeney
164.
165.

1990).
132 F.R.D. 670, 676-77 (N.D. I11.
Water Technologies, 132 F.R.D. at 676 n.4.
In re Lifchitz, 131 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1991); In re T.M.
1990).
& Sons LTL Servs., Inc., 120 B.R. 101, 105 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
120 B.R. at 106-07.
825 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1987).
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of execution-thereby at last perfecting his security interest."'6 The
creditor also commenced citation proceedings, which the court recognized under Asher as the only way in Illinois to secure a judgment
debtor's intangible assets, in that case, a patent license.' 67 However,
the court ruled that any citation lien lapsed after six months, because
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 277(f) provides that a citation proceeding
terminates automatically after six months. The court noted that the
lien of judgment does not last for the full period of the effectiveness
of a judgment but only as long as the enforcement mechanism;
creditors must move promptly to satisfy their judgments so as not to
encumber property indefinitely.' The King analysis was used by the
T.M. Sweeney court as an additional reason why a citation lien would
not be perfected, as the lien or restraint was only a temporary
measure. 69 While the bankruptcy courts were holding that the commencement of the citation proceeding created the lien, the Seventh
Circuit still relied on the execution.
The preceding cases leave the following questions: (1) whether an
execution creates a lien on intangible property; (2) whether an execution without a levy is attached but not perfected against other
creditors and bona fide purchasers; (3) whether and when a citation
to discover assets creates a lien; (4) if so, whether it is perfected
against other creditors, bona fide purchasers or trustees in bankruptcy;
and (5) whether the creditor should have priority or share with other
judgment creditors.
B.

ANALYSIS OF THE LIEN FROM A CITATION

Two scholars have addressed the issue of whether a supplementary
proceeding can create a lien in personal property. The first discussion
was in a comment by Robert H. Little in 1975.170 The second was in
an article by George W. Breitsameter in 1982.171 Both conclude that
166. Id. at 1183.
167. Id. at 1188; see also McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 691
F.2d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 1982).
168. King, 825 F.2d at 1188 (citing National Bank v. Newberg, 7 Il1. App. 3d
859, 864-65, 289 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1972)); cf. Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14
N.E.2d 478 (1938) (Judgment lien on real estate expires at end of one year provided
for execution.); Minor v. Herriford, 25 Il1. 344, 346 (1861) (Lien of execution expires
after 90 days.).
169. T.M. Sweeney, 120 B.R. at 106; see In re Fowler, 90 B.R. 375, 379-80
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
170. See Little, supra note 19.
171. See Breitsameter, supra note 120.
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a lien may be created in a supplementary proceeding. However,
Breitsameter concluded that the lien arises not at the initiation of the
process, but only when the court orders the property turned over to
the sheriff for sale; Little did not address when the lien arose. Since
these articles were written, changes in the statutes and in the case law,
while not addressing the issue of a lien, support their arguments.
For example, Little noted that some state courts were reluctant
to hold that a citation created a lien when a creditor's bill provided
that remedy. 17 2 The enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1982
eliminated the duplicative proceeding of a creditor's bill. 7 3 Thus, the
Illinois courts should recognize a lien where a creditor's bill line was
recognized. Little commented that Baronski v. Shust,' 74 which held
that a citation did not create a lien, construed the statute strictly since
it was in derogation of common law and queried that, had a restraining provision been involved, a lien might have arisen.' 7 Today, the
Code of Civil Procedure provides that its remedies are to be construed77
liberally, 76 and section 2-1402 now provides for a restraining order.
Both Little and Breitsameter argued that since a court in a supplementary proceeding could enter any order that could be entered in a
garnishment proceeding, 78 and a garnishment creates a lien, 79 then a
supplementary proceeding could create a lien.180 However, a garnishment lien arises when served upon a third party and not the judgment
debtor.' Conflicts between a garnishor and a prior judgment creditor
have seldom arisen because a garnishment concerns debts owed to the
judgment debtor'8 2 which is an intangible property the sheriff cannot
reach as a good or chattel in an execution and levy. 8 3
Little, supra note 19, at 435.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-101 (1991).
218 Ill. App. 8, 11 (1920).
Little, supra note 19, at 432, 436.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-106 (1991); Second New Haven Bank v.
Inc., 86 Ill. App. 3d 832, 835, 408 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1980).
177. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402(d) (1991).
178. Id. para. 2-1402(b)(4) (1991); see also Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc.,
126 Ill. 2d 307, 314, 533 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (1989).
179. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-707 (1991); see Maplehurst Farms v.
Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Co., 167 Ill. App. 3d 767, 770, 521 N.E. 2d
1270, 1272 (1988); Fornoff v. Smith, 281 Ill. App. 232, 237 (1935).
180. Little, supra note 19, at 437; Breitsameter, supra note 120, at 696.
181. See National Bank v. Newberg, 7 Ill. App. 3d 859, 866, 289 N.E.2d 197,
202 (1972); B.J. Lind & Co. v. Diacou, 3 Ill. App. 3d 299, 302, 278 N.E. 2d 526,
527 (1971).
182. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-701 (1991).
183. See Myres v. Frankenthal, 55 Ill. App. 390, 399 (1894); see also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-714 (1991)..
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
Kobrite,
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Section 2-1402 is based on a New York statute.8 4 The Illinois
Supreme Court has recently held that section 2-1402 should be construed in accordance with the New York law." 5 Unfortunately, the
ambiguity in the New York law occasioned great confusion and led
to varying results and to the repeal of the statute.8 6 Some courts held
that the asset-discovery subpoena was similar to a creditor's bill in
equity and when served with restraining provision created a lien
superior to a subsequent execution and levy. Under the new statute,
however, the New York courts have held that a supplementary proceeding creates a lien only when the court orders the property turned
over to the sheriff; a lien is not created by the mere service of the
citation with a restraining provision.8 7 The restraining provision
cannot be equated with the writ of execution or an order of turnover
directing the sheriff to reduce the property to fund the judgment.,
However, the order of turnover has priority over a later levy; otherwise, it takes its place with other orders for turnover or levies against
the proceeds of the property seized by the sheriff, under a first-intime, first-in-right analysis.8 9 This interpretation complies with the
equitable principal in Illinois law which grants priority to creditors
who discover property in the hands of third parties prior to another
creditor's levy.' 90 While New York puts the rule into a statute, 9' the
lack of statutory law in Illinois makes any result uncertain.
One problem with the order of turnover arises when the court
orders the property delivered to the sheriff when he holds executions
for other creditors. Section 12-169 of the Illinois Code of Civil
184. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402 (Historical and Practice Notes, at
865) (Smith-Hurd 1983) (citing N.Y. Crv. PR&c. ACT §§ 773, 781, 783, 799).
185. Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc. 126 I11.307, 315, 533 N.E.2d 1080,
1083-84 (1989).
186. See City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287 (1965).
187. See Panzirer, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 287; Steingart Assoc., Inc. v. Lots of Fun,
Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (1985).
188. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88; cf. Bank of Aspen, 126 II1. 2d at 321,

533 N.E.2d at 1085 (A citation restraint does not constitute a seizure.).

189. City of New York v. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287-88 (1965) (citing
N.Y. Crv. Pa&c. L & R. 5222, 5224, 5234(c)).
190. See Russell v. Chicago Trust & Sav. Bank, 159 II1. 538, 549-50, 29 N.E.
37, 38, 40 (1891); Rappleye v. International Bank, 93 I11.396, 400; First Nat'l Bank
v. Gage, 93 I11.172, 174-75 (1879); cf. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 4-142 (1991)
(Illinois prejudgment attachment law provides that upon judgment, the judgment
creditors share the proceeds pro rata, but the procuring creditor has priority.);
Kennedy v. Wikoff, 21 111. App. 277, 281-82 (1886) (Garnishing creditors are not

required to share as attachment creditors are.).

191. Panzirer, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (citing N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5234(c)).
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Procedure directs that the sheriff satisfy the earlier executions, but
equity demands that the procuring creditor be given priority. Also, at
least one court has ordered the citation respondent to sell the debtor's
assets in its possession and to bypass the sheriff altogether; the court
construed section 2-1402(b)(3) liberally and held that section 2-1402(c),
which directs all property to be delivered to the sheriff, did not
exclude the result. 92 This result makes sense especially when the
property is intangible, which the sheriff does not have authority to
sell. Similarly, while section 12-714 of the garnishment law 93 directs
that nonmonetary property be turned over to the sheriff for sale, such
property can only be goods or chattels, since the sheriff's duty is
delineated by the execution and levy limitations.194 With other property, the court may order the garnishee to sell the property in its
possession. 195
In addition, one purpose of the lien is to give other creditors
notice of the creditor's interest. The service of a citation, even with a
restraining provision, does not notify creditors and bona fide purchasers of a possible lien. Prosecuting the supplementary proceeding
to an order of turnover gives that notice because the assets will be
seized by the sheriff under section 2-1402(c). I9 While at least one
court has ruled that the supplementary proceeding court may order
the assets to be sold other than by the sheriff, 197 either sale or turnover
would provide the same notice that the debtor no longer controlled
the assets. Similarly, section 9-305 of the UCC provides that a lien
may be perfected by taking possession of the property by the creditor
or by a bailee; leaving the debtor in possession does not provide
notice to third parties of an interest in the property. 98
The restraining provision of section 2-1402(d) is only discretionary. The citation issued by the clerk of the court may contain language
192. North Bank v. F & H Resources, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 950, 952-53, 369
N.E.2d 174, 176 (1977) (construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 73(2),(3) (1975)).
193. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-714 (1991).
194. Myres v. Frankenthal, 55 Ill. App. 390, 399 (1894). However, the sheriff
has no difficulty in selling the intangible beneficial interest in a land trust under the
new Mortgage Foreclosure Law. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106 (1991).
195. See Marcheschi v. P.I. Corp. 84 Ill. App. 3d 873, 880-81, 405 N.E.2d 1230,
1236 (1980) (construing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, paras. 46-50); Kryl v. Pierce, 289 Il.
App. 10, 6 N.E.2d 521 (1937).
196. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402(c) (1991).
197. See North Bank v. F & H Resources, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 950, 953, 369
N.E.2d 174, 176 (1977).
198. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-305 (1989); cf. In re Marriage of Souleles,
111 I11. App. 3d 865, 444 N.E.2d 721, 724 (1982) (no garnishment of savings account
without possession of pass book).
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prohibiting the citation respondent from transferring assets. Since it
is not an injunction, section 2-1402(d) does not require the creditor
to post a bond or file an affidavit of need. l 9 The restraint is
punishable by the court under its contempt power, or the court may
enter a judgment in the amount of the property transferred away.2a 0
The statute does not provide that a lien follows the transfer of the
asset absent further proceedings. However, where the citation does
not provide a restraint, the respondent should not be subject to an
order of contempt, because he has violated no order. 20 1 The bare
assertion that "a citation creates a lien" is of little help when the
court does not analyze whether there is an order of turnover in the
proceeding or mere service of the initial citation; involvement of a
third-party custodian of assets or merely the debtor; or whether the
citation contains a restraining provision.
Thus, no lien should arise from the service of the citation to
discover assets served upon the debtor alone. To the extent that the
optional restraint can be deemed to provide a lien in favor of the
creditor,20 2 it is not perfected against other creditors or bona fide
purchasers, who may have no notice of the initiation of the citation
proceedings. 203 The debtor is still in possession of the assets, and the
sheriff or a sequestrator has not come to segregate, seize, remove the
assets or given other notice to the public. At most, the lien would
have priority over that of a later creditor serving a citation over that
person. However, no Illinois cases have dealt with a priority dispute
between citation creditors. A court may instead mechanically void the
199. Bank of Aspen v. Fox Cartage, Inc., 126 Ill. 2d 307, 316, 533 N.E.2d 1080,

1084 (1989).
200. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1402(d)(1) (1991); Bank of Aspen, 126 Ill.
2d at 313, 533 N.E.2d at 1083; Laborers' Pension Fund v. Dirty Work Unlimited,

Inc., 919 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1990).
201. There is a difference in the preprinted forms provided by the various clerks

of the courts. The citation form in Cook County includes a restraining warning. The
forms in Du Page and Lake Counties, however, leave the bottom of the form blank
for creditors to add the discretionary restraining language.

202. Little, supra note 19, at 437. Contra General Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 545 F.
Supp. 788, 797 (C.D. Ill. 1982); Kaiser-Ducett Corp. v. Chicago-Joliet Livestock
Mktg. Ctr., Inc., 86 Il1.App. 3d 216, 219, 407 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (1980). Compare
the discussion of the lien of garnishment in Kryl v. Pierce, 289 Il1.App. 10, 17-18,
6 N.E.2d 521, 524 (1937) that the lien does not stop a garnishee from selling the
debtor's asset - it merely informs him of the penalty for not turning over the

proceeds - to the discussion of the citation restraint in Bank of Aspen, 126 I11.2d
at 316, 533 N.E. 2d at 1084.
203. Cf. Hallorn v. Trum, 125 Ill. 247, 254 (1888); In re Lifchitz, 131 B.R. 827,

833 (1991).
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first creditor's priority for lack of diligence in perfecting the lien by
obtaining an order of turnover. 204
Whether a lien arises also depends on whether the supplementary
proceeding is directed against the debtor herself or against a third
party holding her assets. The creditor may serve the debtor or the
custodian with a citation to obtain authority over her intangible assets,
which a *sheriff's levy cannot reach. As in a garnishment, the lien can
be deemed to commence, or be perfected, at the time of service since,
under section 9-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code, third parties
should not assume property in the hands of other bailees belongs to
the debtor prior to extending credit; 20 5 a prior creditor may perfect
his interest by taking possession. Similarly, an attorney's lien in a
chose in action attaches upon the service of his notice upon the
defendant, a third party, to secure the debtor-client's obligation to
pay fees.3 The creditor might serve the citation upon the debtor's
bank or stockbroker to discover any of her assets in their custody.
The judgment creditor may have priority over other creditors who
subsequently serve a citation or other notice, but until the court orders
turnover of the discovered assets, other good faith parties might rely
upon the assets to extend more credit to her.
Moreover, the law has always rewarded diligence in discovering
assets. The rule derived from Levine, that an execution creditor
obtains a lien over intangible property, conflicts with the prior cases
that a creditor who pursues third parties and discovers hidden assets
is entitled to priority. In Levine, however, the creditor perfected its
possible execution lien by proceeding with a citation. Subsequent cases
failed to distinguish between a lien effective against a second party
and a perfected lien effective against third parties. A creditor who
discovers a third party, serves a citation upon him, restrains him from
transferring the property, and obtains an order of turnover should be
granted priority over a creditor who merely executed by handing the
sheriff's office a certified copy of judgment.
IV.

EFFORTS AT REFORM

Besides the uncertainty involved in citation proceedings, the whole
framework of executions and levies, as it concerns personal property,
204. See T.M. Sweeney, 120 B.R. at 106; Fowler, 90 B.R. at 379-80.
205. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-305 (1991); cf. id. paras. 8-108, 8-320
(1991) (registration of pledge of uncertificated secutities).
206. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 13, para. 14 (1991); see McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc.
v. Board of Education, 691 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1982); In re del Grosso, 111 B.R. 178
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); Fornoff v. Smith, 281 I1. App. 232, 237 (1935).
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should be reformed to conform it to modern practice. The rules are
derived from nineteenth century cases where a local sheriff could
track down the assets of a farmer or small merchant. The rules did
not anticipate the creation of forms of personal property not imaginable 100 or even 50 years ago. The rules do not conform to modern
rules of finance. The uncertainty of perfection can unjustly deprive
creditors of a lien in the debtor's assets. With regard to intangible
property, the creditor does not know whether a court will follow the
Levine and Asher rule, that a lien on the chose in action is created
by the delivery of the certified copy of judgment to the sheriff, or
the later rule of Rochford, that no lien is created. The creditor must
follow his execution with a citation, but this solution may or may not
provide protection from a bona fide purchaser or a trustee in bankruptcy, at least not until he obtains an order of turnover. An order
entered pursuant to section 2-1402(b)(2) requiring the debtor to make
installment payments to a judgment creditor could be in jeopardy of
a subsequent execution and levy upon the debtor.
Even with proper delivery of execution for tangible property, the
lien is of limited and uncertain value. It expires after 90 days. The
lien may be lost by negotiating with the debtor or by trying to
maximize the proceeds from the sale of goods from an orderly, rather
than a distress, sale. The creditor may be deemed to have waived the
execution by seeking another execution on other assets. The seizure
or segregation of assets by the sheriff may be deemed insufficient to
give notice to third parties and thus not support a prior creditor's
putative lien. Conversely, the debtor's possession of the goods under
a forthcoming bond may not give subsequent creditors notice that the
sheriff has secured the goods as part of the execution and levy of a
prior creditor's judgment. The execution process is time consuming
and expensive and not without the risk of creating liability for
wrongful execution. The lost priority rule may force the creditor to
close down the debtor even when the only hope of payment arises
from continued operations. Thus, the levy and execution system, as
the framework for priorities among judgment creditors, is seriously
flawed.
Several states have modified their law on judgments by allowing
creditors to file a record of their interests as they would any interest
under Article IX of the UCC.207 Currently, the debtor must sign the
financing statement, which, when filed, gives notice of the security
207. See William J. Woodward, New Judgment Liens on Personal Property:

Does "Efficient" Mean "Better"?, 27 HAv. J.

ON

LEGIs. 1 (1990).
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interest. 208 California, 2°9 Connecticut 210 and Maine21 have enacted
statutes which allow creditors to perfect a judgment lien on personal
property easily and inexpensively by filing a UCC statement in the
appropriate office. This action gives notice to other creditors and is
long-lasting. The sheriff and the creditors do not bear the risk of a
wrongful levy. By incorporating the UCC, the statutes protect buyers
in the ordinary course of business 212 and subsequent purchase-money
creditors. 21 Judgment creditors may use the enforcement mechanisms
of the UCC 21 4 to sell the assets, and they are protected during the

negotiation stage and during the presale arrangement period.
However, the problem with these statutes is that they create a
blanket lien with priority over all of the debtor's assets. Illinois law
has always rewarded the creditor who expends funds to seek hidden
property in the hands of third parties. Often, one creditor's efforts

will produce funds for other creditors. 2" By apportioning priority

strictly on the basis of a first-in-time filing, the new statutes discourage
subsequent judgment creditors from tracking down hidden assets and
fraudulent conveyances.
Iowa has enacted an alternative procedure where the creditor may
file a UCC statement listing an inventory of the goods actually
discovered during a levy by the sheriff. 2 6 This system corrects some
of the inequities that a bare seizure entails and gives creditors notice
of the lien to the same extent as a contractual security interest. All
forms of judgment liens were already subordinate to validly perfected
contractual liens. Moreover, the Iowa statute rewards the diligent
creditor who pursued the levy first in time as well as future diligent
creditors who discover hidden assets which are not encumbered by
blanket judgment liens. Permitting the recording of the judgment lien
208. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-402 (1989).
209. CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE § 697.570 (West Supp. 1989).

210.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 52-355a (West 1986).

§ 4651-A (West Supp. 1988).
212. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-307 (1989); see, e.g., Chicago Limousine
Serv., Inc. v. Hartigan Cadillac, Inc., 191 11. App. 3d 886, 894, 548 N.E.2d 386,
2d 216, 564 N.E.2d 797 (1990).
390-91 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 139 111.
213. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-312(4) (1991).
211. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,

214. Id. para. 9-501.

215. See Aspling v. Ferrall, 232 Ill. App. 3d. 758, 597 N.E.2d 1221 (1992). Since
the reward rule was created in equity, the rule could be expanded to reward these
creditors. Cf. Bair v. State Farm Ins. Co., 66 11. 2d 119, 124, 361 N.E.2d 1100
(1977); Meyers v. Hablutzel, No. 2-91-1474 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. Oct. 23, 1992)
(applying the equitable fund doctrine to insurance subrogation).
216. IOWA R. Cirv. P. 260(b).
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would also provide a bright-line test to resolve whether a judgment
creditor's lien is superior to that of later creditors or the trustee in
bankruptcy. 2 7 Moreover, the Iowa statute avoids the potential problem arising under the California, Connecticut and Maine statutes
which may eliminate the benefits of a bankruptcy reorganization.
Under the latter three systems, the property of the estate may be so
encumbered with judgment liens that no free assets will remain for
unsecured creditors; 28 however, this problem occurs only if the liens
are stale, because judicial liens arising within 90 days of the filing of
219
the bankruptcy petition may be voided by the trustee.
CONCLUSION

The State of Illinois should reform Article XII of the Code of
Civil Procedure to conform judgment collection procedures to modern
practice, the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code. Section 12-111 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, rather than stating when a lien of judgment
is not binding, should explain when it is, what it binds and how it is
created. The duties of a sheriff to discover property should be shifted
to the creditor. The amendments should explain when a levy as
opposed to a nonwage garnishment may be used to obtain control
over intangible property. The amendments should also clarify section
2-1402 to explain the nature, creation, extent and duration of the lien
it creates. Judgment creditors should be able to perfect their liens by
filing a financing statement under the UCC with notice to the debtor,
while making arrangements to organize installment payments or an
orderly sale of assets. The diligence rule, which voids prior creditor's
liens, should not be applied in the absence of a showing of detrimental
reliance of the prior creditor's forebearance. Section 12-169 of the
Code of Civil Procedure should be amended to reward judgment
creditors who discover assets over prior judgment creditors. Forthcoming bonds under section 12-162 should be protected with a UCC
filing. In the meantime, judgment creditors must take redundant
procedures to protect their judgments.
217. The Illinois Supreme Court in Everingham v. National City Bank, 124 Il1.
527, 536, 17 N.E. 26, 29 (1888), noted the lack of a bright-line test to determine
whether a senior creditor lost priority. In Davidson v. Waldron, 31 111. 120 (1863), it
was the sheriff's insufficient sequestration of assets which resulted in the loss of a
lien.
218. See Woodward, supra note 207, at 34.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). In addition, liens unsupported by any security may
be voided. Id. § 506.
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As this article was going to print, the Legislative and Civil
Practice Committees of the Chicago Bar Association approved a draft
proposal to amend section 2-1402 (735 ILCS 5/2-1402). Because the
draft must be submitted to the Association's Board of Managers, it
is not final. Under it, section 2-14020) would provide that the
judgment became a lien on the personal property of the debtor in the
control of the person served; the judgment would also bind the
debtor's property received by that person in the period the citation is
effective. The rights of bona fide purchasers and creditors without
notice of the lien would not be affected. However, the lien should be
effective only if served with a section 2-1402(d) restraining provision
because a party should not be bound by a lien unless she is warned
with a proper notice not to dispose of the property. The creation of
the lien is intertwined with the judicial powers prohibiting alienation.
An earlier version of the draft provided the creditor could provide
notice by recording the citation as a financing statement under the
Uniform Commercial Code

